Excerpt
This leads to the conclusion that every projection of the world–
whether philosophical, poetic, or scientific–has as its foundation
the rational poietic Imaginative, which creates rational possible
worlds.
Thus, if we have established that sensibility in general–namely,
time and space as pure sensible intuitions–are nothing but poietic
Imaginative categories, somehow embedded within human
thought itself, and therefore do not belong to transcendent objectivity,
then the intellect as well, although distinct from sensibility,
is merely the sum of a number of faculties that Kant develops in
essentially psychological terms. What is entirely absent, however,
is the necessity and causality governing the development of these
intellectual faculties. As the faculty of thinking the object of sensible
intuition, the Kantian intellect possesses only empty thoughts,
mere forms, since intuitions without these forms are devoid of any
content whatsoever. Certainly, by relying solely upon the “spontaneity
of thought”–a term Kant borrows from Leibniz–the entire
theory of the intellect lacks precisely the content supplied by the a
priori poietic Imaginative, which embraces both the sensible component,
the inner sense, the categories, as well as judgments and
reason itself. This constitutes the fundamental difference between
our conception of knowledge and Kant’s. In what follows, we shall
apply in concreto this construction, which we call the rational a
priori Imaginative, to the thought-structures developed by the
great civilisations of the world, with particular emphasis upon the
Greek and European models that are of primary concern to the
present work.
